Informal Insurance and Income Inequality by Laczó, Sarolta
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Informal Insurance and Income
Inequality
Sarolta Laczo´
February 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7197/
MPRA Paper No. 7197, posted 17. February 2008 08:19 UTC
Informal Insurance and Income Inequality∗
Sarolta Laczó†
February 2008
Abstract
This paper examines the effects of income inequality in a risk sharing model
with limited commitment, that is, when insurance agreements have to be self-
enforcing. In this context, numerical dynamic programming is used to examine
three questions. First, I consider heterogeneity in mean income, and study the
welfare effects when inequality together with aggregate income increases. Second,
subsistence consumption is introduced to see how it affects consumption smooth-
ing. Finally, income is endogenized by allowing households to choose between two
production technologies, to look at the importance of consumption insurance for
income smoothing.
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1 Introduction
In low-income village economies we often observe incomplete markets. Financial in-
struments or formal insurance contracts are often lacking. However, growing empirical
evidence suggests that households enter into informal risk sharing arrangements, and
achieve some, though not perfect insurance. The questions are then, (i) how this partial
insurance can be modeled, (ii) what are its implications for the consumption and wel-
fare of households, and (iii) what policies are appropriate in this context. This paper
considers a model where informal insurance is characterized by limited commitment,
in other words, insurance arrangements have to be self-enforcing (Kocherlakota (1996),
Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002)). This setting allows us to explain the observed
partial insurance and shed some light on the mechanisms involved.
Examining informal risk sharing in the context of developing countries is important
for two main reasons. On the one hand, people living in low-income, rural areas of-
ten face a huge amount of risk. Revenue from agricultural production is usually low
and volatile, further, outside job opportunities are often lacking. On the other hand,
financial instruments, or formal, legally enforceable insurance contracts are often not
available to smooth consumption inter-temporally or across states of nature. The ques-
tion is then, how can people in these kinds of environments somehow mitigate the
effects of risk they face. Growing empirical evidence suggests that households achieve
something better than autarky, but not quite perfect risk sharing (see the seminal pa-
per by Townsend (1994), among many others), by transfers, gifts, quasi-credit, and the
like among relatives, neighbours, or friends (see, for example, anthropological work by
Platteau and Abraham (1987) and Platteau (1997)). This means that consumption
reacts to idiosyncratic changes in income, but the variance of consumption is less than
that of income.
Informal insurance is modeled in this paper by supposing that contracts have to be
self-enforcing, because often no authority exists to enforce insurance agreements in poor
villages in developing countries, while informational problems are less important. This
approach yields partial insurance, which is consistent with empirical evidence. The
model has a wide range of interpretations. In addition to thinking about households in
a village, we may consider members of a family (Mazzocco, 2007), an employee and an
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employer (Thomas and Worrall, 1988), or countries (Kehoe and Perri, 2002).
In this paper an infinite-horizon model is considered with risk-averse households,
whose income follows some exogenous, discrete stochastic process, that is common
knowledge. I concentrate on insurance across states of nature, and ignore savings,
or storage. I look for a constrained-efficient solution, maximizing a utilitarian social
welfare function subject to resource constraints and enforcement constraints. That is,
it is required that, for each household at every period and every state of the world,
staying in the informal risk sharing contract be better than reverting to autarky. If
income is independently and identically distributed (iid) or follows a Markov-process,
we have the following important property characterizing the solution: the current ratios
of marginal utilities between households, and therefore the consumption allocation,
depends only on current income realizations and the ratios of marginal utilities in the
previous period. In addition, unlike in the perfect risk sharing case, the allocation in
the limited commitment solution depends not only on aggregate income, but also on its
distribution. This is because individual income determines the utility a household may
get were she in autarky, that is, her threatpoint. This threatpoint in turn determines
the household’s bargaining, or decision power.
This paper examines the interaction of income inequality and self-enforcing risk
sharing contracts. To do this, three types of simulation exercises are performed in the
context of the model of risk sharing with limited commitment. In all cases I assume that
only two households populate the village economy, and that each household’s income
may take only two values, for clarity and computational ease.
First, I consider a “poor” household interacting with a “rich” one. The households
have the same isoelastic, or constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) utility function,
and they differ in their mean income, while they face the same amount of risk in the
sense that the standard deviation of their income process is the same. I perform a
comparative statics exercise: while keeping the income process of the poor the same,
the mean income of the rich is increased, thereby increasing inequality together with
aggregate and per-capita income. Note that we do not expect this type of inequality
to have any adverse effects, since what happens is just that in each state of the world
we give more income to the rich, while leaving the income of the poor unchanged.
However, for some reasonable parameter values, the poor is worse off when inequality
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together with per-capita income increases. This is in contrast with Genicot (2006),
who emphasizes the possible positive effects of inequality, keeping aggregate income
constant. The intuition behind my result is that the poor household’s relative decision
power decreases vis-a-vis the rich, thus she can secure smaller net transfers in the
limited commitment solution. Another way of putting it is that the rich demands less
insurance, she behaves in a less risk-averse fashion, thus the rich does not value the
contract much. The result warns of the possible adverse consequences of inequality for
the poor even when per-capita income increases in the community, the reason being
that the poor is more and more excluded from informal insurance arrangements.
Second, I take just one pair of income processes, but “subsistence consumption”,
or, a “subsistence level” is added. In other words, I suppose decreasing relative risk
aversion (Ogaki and Zhang, 2001). The effects of changes in the subsistence level is
examined in this example. A higher subsistence level makes insurance more valuable for
both agents, thus it may make perfect risk sharing self-enforcing. Here it is interesting
to look at the properties of the consumption process, since income does not change.
The consumption of the poor becomes less volatile as the subsistence level increases,
but she has to sacrifice mean consumption to compensate the rich for the insurance
she provides. Further, when perfect risk sharing is self-enforcing, aggregate risk can be
shared more efficiently.
Finally, in the last example economy, income in endogenized. In particular, the
possibility to choose between two production technologies is introduced, to examine the
consequences of lack of insurance for income smoothing (Morduch, 1995). A technology
is described by the income process it generates. As in the first example, households
have standard CRRA utility functions. In two numerical examples, I consider two types
of heterogeneity in turn, (i) the rich household has some exogenous wealth that yields
a fixed revenue every period, and (ii) the two households differ in their risk preferences.
Note that also in case (i), the rich behaves in a less risk-averse fashion. Further, in each
period, households may choose between two technologies, an “old”, safer technology
with lower expected values, and a “new”, riskier, but more profitable technology. I look
at households’ technology choice both with and without informal insurance. In both
numerical examples, when an informal risk sharing contract becomes available, one
household switches to the riskier technology with higher expected profits, in all states
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of the world and time periods. This result illustrates the importance of consumption
insurance for production choices, and the negative consequences high risk aversion may
have on expected profits, for example when households living near the subsistence level
are willing to bear very little risk.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses some related
literature. Section 3 outlines the model of risk sharing with limited commitment, and
talks about some characteristics of the solution. An algorithm to numerically solve the
model is described in the appendix. Section 4 presents simulation results to examine the
interaction between informal risk sharing and income inequality. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
There is a growing literature on informal insurance in rural communities in developing
countries. It has been recognized that even without formal contracts, households enter
into risk sharing arrangements. In a world with complete information and perfect
commitment, informal insurance would even achieve the first best, or full insurance, that
is, the ratios of marginal utilities would stay the same in all states of nature and across
time. This perfect risk sharing outcome can be imagined as the case where incomes are
pooled in the village, and then redistributed according to some predetermined weights.
A number of papers test the hypothesis of full insurance in low-income village economies
(see Townsend (1994) for Indian villages in the semi-arid tropics, Grimard (1997) using
data from Ivory Coast, Dubois (2000) on Pakistan, Dercon and Krishnan (2003a, 2003b)
working with Ethiopian data, Laczó (2005) using Bangladeshi data, and Mazzocco and
Saini (2007) for India, among others). Perfect insurance is rejected, but a remarkable
amount of risk sharing is found. Thus a next step is to think about partial insurance,
how and why households achieve something better than autarky, but not full insurance.
In modeling partial insurance, we may relax the assumption of complete information
or perfect commitment. Ligon (1998) introduces private information in a dynamic
setting. He derives Euler-equation type reduced form restrictions to test the private
information model against the alternatives of full insurance and the permanent income
hypothesis. Ligon (1998) finds that consumption in two of the three Indian villages
examined is best explained by the private information model, while in the third village
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different households seem to belong to different regimes, but most of them are classified
as belonging to the permanent income regime. Wang (1995) establishes some theoretical
results for the model of risk sharing with private information, and provides an algorithm
to compute the solution.
The second approach is to relax the assumption of perfect commitment, and instead
require contracts to be self-enforcing. One may argue that this way of modeling partial
insurance in small, rural communities is more appropriate, since households are able to
observe what their neighbors are doing and shocks they face (crop damage, or illness for
example), but there is no commitment device, like an independent authority, to enforce
contracts. In addition, arguably this model is also appropriate when one thinks about
risk sharing within the family, since husband and wife are free to end the contract, that
is, they may divorce. Introducing lack of commitment extends the standard collective
model of the household (Browning and Chiappori, 1998) in an interesting way (see
Mazzocco (2007)). Another interpretation is long-term labour contracts, where both
employer and employee may choose to end the contract in favour of an outside option
(Thomas and Worrall, 1988). A further application concerns the interaction between
two countries, since a country may default on its sovereign debt, facing possible ex-
clusion from future international trade and financial contracts (see Kehoe and Perri
(2002)). Schechter (2007) uses the model to explain the interaction between a farmer
and a thief.
One-sided limited commitment is relevant for principal-agent models, for example
in the case of a contract between an insurance company and an insured, where the
insurance company (the principal) is fully committed, while the insured (the agent) is
not. For empirical evidence on one-sided limited commitment see the work of Hendel
and Lizzeri (2003) on life insurance, and Crocker and Moran (2003) on health insurance.
Two-sided limited commitment is introduced in a dynamic wage contract setting by
Thomas and Worrall (1988). A very important result they derive is that contracts are
history dependent, that is, past outcomes influence today’s payoffs.
Kimball (1988) is the first to argue that informal risk sharing in a community may
be achieved with voluntary participation of all members. He shows that for reasonable
values of the discount factor and the coefficient of relative risk aversion, households
could provide a substantial amount of insurance to one another. Early contributions
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to modeling risk sharing with limited commitment include Coate and Ravallion (1993),
who introduce two-sided limited commitment in a dynamic model, but they restrict
contracts to be static. Their characterization of transfers is not optimal, once we allow
for history-dependent contracts. On the other hand, Kocherlakota (1996) allows for
dynamic contracts, and proves existence and some properties of the solution, but he
does not give an explicit characterization. Early empirical evidence on dynamic limited
commitment is provided by Foster and Rosenzweig (2001). They test the restriction
that there is a negative relationship between the current transfer and aggregate past
transfers, and they find some supporting evidence. Anthropological work by Platteau
(1997) also points out the importance of limited commitment in informal risk sharing
contracts. Charness and Genicot (2006) provide experimental evidence in support of
the model.
Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002) characterize and calculate the solution of a dy-
namic model of risk sharing with limited commitment. As a result, the authors are able
to test in a structural manner the hypothesis of dynamic limited commitment against
the alternatives of perfect risk sharing, autarky, and the static limited commitment
model of Coate and Ravallion (1993). They find evidence in support of the dynamic
limited commitment model, using data from Indian villages. In addition, Ligon et al.
(2002) derive a number of theoretical properties of the solution. In particular, they
look at the effect of changing the discount factor, relative income across different states
of the world (or different riskiness of the environment), and the direct penalty faced
by the household breaking the agreement. More risk raises the demand for insurance,
while a higher discount factor and harsher penalties help to enforce more risk sharing.1
Attanasio and Ríos-Rull (2000) examine the effects of the introduction of an ag-
gregate insurance scheme in a world with informal insurance and lack of commitment.
They show, by an example, that aggregate insurance might reduce welfare. The reason
is that aggregate insurance crowds out informal insurance, because it raises the value
of autarky, and in some cases it even crowds out more insurance than it provides. The
1Ligon et al. (2002) assume no savings. In another contribution (Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall,
2000) the authors look at the effects of savings, and show, by an example, that the possibility to save
may decrease welfare. In general, it is difficult to allow for savings in a model with limited commitment,
since savings enter the enforceability constraints, and I will assume away savings as well.
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authors also present some suggestive empirical evidence on the crowding out of private
transfers by public ones using data from Mexico, but their approach is reduced form,
and they do not actually use the theoretical model to predict private transfers.
An important innovation of the above papers is the methodology used to calculate
the solution of the problem. Ligon et al. (2002) use a Pareto-frontier approach to
find the solution of the risk sharing with limited commitment model. Attanasio and
Ríos-Rull (2000) and Kehoe and Perri (2002) apply a slightly different methodology,
building on the work of Marcet and Marimon (1998). In this approach the social
planner’s problem is examined. The problem is a difficult one, since future decision
variables enter into today’s enforcement constraints, thus the problem is not recursive.
However, the weights of households’ utilities in the social planner’s objective, equal to
the ratio of marginal utilities in equilibrium, can be introduced as a co-state variable.
With the new (co-)state variable the problem has a recursive structure. I use this later
approach in this paper.
Some extensions of the model of risk sharing with limited commitment have been
developed recently. Genicot and Ray (2003) consider possible deviations by a group
of households in an informal risk sharing arrangement among n households. The main
message of their paper is that the stability of a risk sharing group with respect to
deviations by a smaller group is a complex issue, and there is not much we can say
in general. One interesting result is that stable groups are limited in size. Wahhaj
(2006) introduces public goods, and shows that in this case, private consumption of
a member may increase when the community experiences an adverse aggregate shock.
He argues that this result is consistent with empirical evidence provided by Duflo and
Udry (2003) on intrahousehold allocation in Cote d’Ivoire. Dubois, Jullien, and Magnac
(2007) consider both formal and informal contracts. Formal contracts are short-term,
so households may complement these by self-enforcing, informal ones. The authors use
semi-parametric techniques to test the model, and find that it explains well the con-
sumption of Pakistani households. Hertel (2007) considers both limited commitment
and private information. As a simplification, one household receives a fixed income
each period, while the second household’s income is stochastic, and its realization is
her private information. The author shows that, with additional incomplete informa-
tion, consumption adjusts slowly to income changes, while there still exists a unique
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nondegenerate stationary distribution of utilities.
The literature examining the relation between insurance and inequality includes
Morduch (1994), who draws attention to the fact that lack of insurance may exacerbate
poverty. In a simple model, he shows that a lack of consumption credit may lead
the poor to forego risky, but profitable investment opportunities. Fafchamps (2002)
summarizes some results concerning different concepts of inequality (income, wealth,
cash-in-hand, consumption, and welfare) in environments that differ in the type of
assets available and in risk sharing opportunities. He briefly talks about the limited
commitment case as well, and states that, the more efficient risk sharing is, the more
persistent poverty is, and that limited commitment, as a departure from perfect risk
sharing, allows for social mobility2. Furthermore, the author talks about the emergence
of patronage in polarized societies, meaning that the rich provides insurance to the
poor in exchange for net transfers from the poor on average. With positive returns
to assets, patronage is transitory, because in the long run the poor also accumulates
sufficient assets to self-insure. If returns are negative, patronage reinforces inequality
in the short run, while in the long run all wealth is depleted.
Krueger and Perri (2006) explain the fact that, in the United States, cross-sectional
consumption inequality has not increased as much as income inequality, using the model
of risk sharing with limited commitment. However, the authors consider ex-ante iden-
tical households, only the income realizations differ in a given period, and are perfectly
negatively correlated. In this setting, what they actually show is that there is partial in-
surance. Partial insurance implies, by definition, that consumption is less volatile than
income across states of the world, which is equivalent to there being less consumption
than income inequality in the cross-section.
Genicot (2006) examines similar issues as the present paper. The author considers
the model of risk sharing with limited commitment as well. She argues that (i) in some
cases wealth inequality may help risk sharing in the sense that perfect risk sharing
is possible in a wider range of cases, and that (ii) total welfare may increase with
inequality, keeping aggregate, or per-capita, wealth3constant. On the modeling side,
2Note that Fafchamps (2002) defines welfare inequality as the ratio of marginal utilities, so there is
no social mobility in terms of welfare in the perfect risk sharing case by definition.
3Note that in this context, “income” and “wealth” are essentially the same, meaning that we think
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an important shortcoming of the paper is that it only considers static contracts, which
have been proven not to be constrained-efficient in the dynamic case. The present paper
allows for history-dependent contracts.
3 Modeling Informal Insurance
This section presents the basic model. First, we look at perfect risk sharing as a
benchmark. Then, limited commitment is introduced, requiring contracts to be self-
enforcing. The context is a stochastic, dynamic framework with common beliefs, and
egoïstic, risk-averse households consuming a private, perishable good.
For the sake of clarity, let us consider a village, or community, of two households.
Extending the model to n households is straightforward4. The households live in an
uncertain environment: their income realizations are unknown ex ante. Income realiza-
tions are common knowledge ex post. As a consequence, they might choose to insure
through a formal or informal agreement against variation of incomes. Risk sharing can
thus be defined as follows. “Any two [households] may be said to share risk if they
employ state-contingent transfers to increase the expected utility of both by reducing
the risk of at least one.” (Ligon, 2004)
In section 3.1, I describe the model of perfect risk sharing. Formally, households may
sign an enforceable contract in period 0, in other words, we assume full commitment,
and that income realizations are observable by both agents and verifiable by a third
party. In section 3.2, households still observe the income realizations, but they cannot
sign formal insurance contracts. Only informal risk sharing arrangements are possible
instead, meaning that at each period and each state of the world, it is required that
both households respect voluntarily the terms of the agreement.
of both as an amount that is consumed in the current period. In other words, wealth means the fixed
revenue from assets the household owns in each period, rather than the value of assets.
4The theoretical properties can easily be extended in both the perfect risk sharing and the limited
commitment case. The algorithm to compute the solution also logically extends to n households,
however, in the limited commitment case, computation time might be prohibitive with n large.
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3.1 Perfect Risk Sharing
Let us consider a dynamic model of risk sharing. Assume that the economy is populated
by two infinitely-lived households, indexed 1 and 2. Their preferences are identical, and
separable over time and across states of nature. The utility function u () is defined over
a private, perishable consumption good c, and it is assumed to be monotone increasing,
strictly concave (so households are risk averse), and twice continuously differentiable.
Households live in an uncertain environment, and income of each individual yi follows
some exogenous discrete stochastic process, that is common knowledge. In other words,
beliefs about the distribution of the state of nature, or the “income state” (the vector
(income of 1, income of 2)), are homogeneous. In mathematical terms, each agent i
seeks to maximize the following von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility:
E0δ
tu (cit), (1)
where E0 is the expected value at time 0 calculated with respect to the probability
measure describing the common beliefs, δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, and cit is
consumption of household i at time t. I concentrate on insurance across state of nature,
and assume no savings, or storage.
Let st (with a lower index t) denote the income state at time t, and st = (s1, s2, ..., st−1, st)
(with an upper index t) the history of income states up to t. Let us first consider au-
tarky as a benchmark. In autarky, each household consumes her own income in every
state and every period, since there is no possibility to save or borrow. In this case,
household i receives the following expected lifetime utility:
∞∑
t=1
δtpi
(
st
)
u
(
yi
(
st
))
, (2)
where pi (st) is the probability of history st occurring, and yi (st) denotes the income of
individual i at time t when history st has occurred.
Now, suppose that households may sign an enforceable risk sharing contract. A risk
sharing contract specifies transfers that may depend, a priori, on the whole history of
income states st. The timing is the following. At time 0, a risk sharing contract may be
signed, then, at time 1 and each subsequent period, the income state is realized, then
transfers are made according to the contract, and finally, consumption takes place.
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First, the properties of the contract are described, given that it is signed. Then, we
examine under what conditions agents are ready to actually sign the contract at time
0, in other words, we look at the ex-ante participation constraints.
In the presence of complete information, that is, in each period each household
perfectly observes the other household’s income realization, and under full commitment,
the ex-ante Pareto-optimal allocations can be found by considering the social planner’s
problem. The social planner’s objective is to maximize a weighted sum of households’
lifetime utilities,
max
{ci(st)}
∑
i
λi
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
δtpi
(
st
)
u
(
ci
(
st
))
, (3)
where λi is the weight the social planner assigns to household i, and ci (st) denotes
the consumption of individual i at time t when history st has occurred; subject to the
resource constraint
∑
i
ci
(
st
) ≤∑
i
yi
(
st
)
, (4)
for all histories st.
The Lagrangian is
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
δtpi
(
st
) [∑
i
λiu
(
ci
(
st
))
+ γ
(
st
)(∑
i
yi
(
st
)− ci (st))] , (5)
where δtpi (st) γ (st) is the multiplier on the resource constraint at history st. Note
that we can reverse the order of the summation signs because of two properties, (i) the
linearity of the expected utility function, and because (ii) the social planner’s objective
is additive in households’ lifetime utilities (utilitarian social welfare function).
The first order condition for household i, if history st has occurred, is
λiu
′ (ci (st)) = γ (st) (6)
Combining the first order conditions for the two households at history st, we have
u′ (c1 (st))
u′ (c2 (st))
=
λ2
λ1
≡ x0 = cste, (7)
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where x0 is the (initial) relative weight assigned to household 2.
Equation (7) indicates that the ratio of marginal utilities is constant across states
and over time in the case of perfect risk sharing (Wilson, 1968). (7) is also called the
Borch rule. Dividing the first order conditions across periods yields
u′(c1(st))
u′(c1(st−1))
=
u′(c2(st))
u′(c2(st−1))
,∀st ⊃ st−1, (8)
which means that the growth path of marginal utilities of all households is the same.
Note that the expectations operator does not appear in this condition, which is the
hallmark of full insurance.
Equations (7) and (8) give us the three major implications of efficient risk sharing in
this framework. First, the (relative) Pareto weight x0 is constant across time. Second,
the consumption allocation at time t depends only on st, the income realizations at
time t, and is independent of the history of income states st−1. Third and moreover,
the consumption allocation, depends only on aggregate income, and is independent of
the distribution of income. Income pooling together with the constant relative weight
determine the consumption of each agent, and assure ex-ante Pareto efficiency.
To summarize, the consumption allocation at time t, given the current income state
st, only depends on aggregate income y1(st) + y2(st), and the relative weight the social
planner assigns to household 2, x0, which pins down a point on the Pareto-frontier.
Denote ci(st, x0), i = 1, 2, the solution to (7) and (4), noting once again that the
solution ci () only depends on st and is independent of st−1. ci(st, x0) is called the
sharing rule.
Clearly, an ex-ante participation constraint should also be satisfied, that is, at time
0 it must be that the expected lifetime utility for each household signing the contract
is at least as high as in autarky. Technically, this implies that some points of the
Pareto-frontier, or some x0’s, cannot be attained under the risk sharing contract.
To introduce the participation constraints, we have to calculate each agent’s ex-
pected lifetime utility at the moment of contracting, and make sure that it is greater
than the expected lifetime utility under autarky. Assuming that the income state fol-
lows a Markov-process allows us to express agents’ lifetime utility recursively. This is
because with the Markov assumption, the current state st tells us everything we need
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to know about the income process in the past. In mathematical terms, the conditional
distribution of the income state at time t + 1 only depends on the realization of the
income state at t, and not on the whole history.
The Bellman-equation can be written, when the state of the world is st, as
Uauti (st) = u (yi (st)) + δ
∑
st+1
pi (st+1 | st)Uauti (st+1) , (9)
where Uauti (st) is the lifetime utility, or welfare, of household i in autarky, given today’s
state st, or, in other words, Uauti () is the autarkic value function; and pi (st+1 | st) is the
conditional probability of state st+1 occurring tomorrow if state st occurs today, which
is common knowledge. Uauti (st) can easily be found by successive iteration using the
contraction mapping property of the Bellman-equation.
Suppose that the unconditional distribution of the income state at time 1 is known.
Now, we may also compute the expected lifetime utility for agent i at time 0, when the
risk sharing contract may be signed. Ex ante, at time 0, the expected value of autarky
for agent i, denoted EUauti is
EUauti = E0U
aut
i (s1)
Let us now turn to calculating the lifetime utility of household i in the case of perfect
risk sharing, like we did for autarky. Assuming once again that the income process is
Markovian, we have a recursive problem. The value function of agent i at state st and
with weight x0, in the case of perfect risk sharing, can be written recursively as
Uprsi (st, x0) = u (ci (st, x0)) + δ
∑
st+1
pi (st+1 | st)Uprsi (st+1, x0) , (10)
where Uprsi (st, x0) is the value of the infinite consumption stream in case of full insur-
ance, given today’s state st and relative weight x0. As the autarkic utility, the value of
perfect risk sharing can easily be found by successive iteration.
Given x0 and the unconditional distribution of the income state at time 1, the
expected value of the full insurance solution for agent i is denoted EUprsi (x0), and is
given by
EUprsi (x0) = E0U
prs
i (st, x0) .
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At last we may return to the ex-ante participation constraints. So we require that
EUprsi (x0) ≥ EUauti ,∀i, (11)
that is, the value of the perfect risk sharing allocation must be as great as the value
of autarky. (11) rules out for example that one agent makes a transfer to the other
whichever income state occurs. For all x0 such that (11) is satisfied, a contract ensuring
perfect risk sharing is signed at time 0, and is implemented in all subsequent periods.
For other x0’s one agent prefers to stay in autarky, thus no insurance contract is signed.
3.2 Risk Sharing with Limited Commitment
In this section we consider the case when agents are unable to commit, and there is
no authority to enforce risk sharing contracts either, building on Attanasio and Ríos-
Rull (2000), Kocherlakota (1996), Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002), and others.
The objective (3) is maximized, subject to the resource constraints (4), and additional
enforcement constraints. At each time t, after each history st5, and for i = 1, 2, the
following inequality must be satisfied:
∞∑
r=t
∑
sr
δr−tpi
(
sr | st)u (ci (sr)) ≥ Uauti (st) , (12)
where pi (sr | st) is the probability of history sr occurring given that history st occurred
up to period t (r ≥ t).
In words, (12) means that each household’s expected utility from staying in the
informal risk sharing contract must be greater than her expected utility if she deviates
and consumes her own income thereafter. This condition is based on the assumption
that if one household deviates, the other household does not enter into any risk sharing
with her any more. Note that reversion to autarky is the most severe subgame perfect
punishment in this environment (Abreu, 1988). We might call reversion to autarky a
trigger strategy, or the breakdown of trust. We may also call (12) an ex-post participa-
tion constraint, meaning that it requires each agent to voluntarily “sign” the contract
after any realization of the history of states. Obviously, this is a stronger requirement
5I speak about histories again, to write the basic model in a general form.
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than the ex-ante participation constraints that have to be satisfied in the case of perfect
risk sharing.
Notice that adding the constraints (12) substantially complicates the analysis, be-
cause future decision variables enter into today’s enforcement constraints. Thus the
problem at hand no longer has a recursive structure, even with a Markov-process as-
sumption on incomes, and the whole history of states might matter. Following Marcet
and Marimon (1998), Attanasio and Ríos-Rull (2000), and Kehoe and Perri (2002), I
reformulate the problem. By adding a co-state variable, in particular the relative weight
in the social planner’s problem, or, in other words, the ratio of marginal utilities, the
problem can be written in a recursive form.
Denoting the multiplier on the enforcement constraint of household i by δtpi (st)µi (st),
and the multiplier on the resource constraint by δtpi (st) γ (st) when history st has oc-
curred, the Lagrangian is∑∞
t=1
∑
st δ
tpi (st) [
∑
i λiu (ci (s
t)) + (13)
+µi (st) (
∑∞
r=t
∑
sr δ
r−tpi (sr | s)u (ci (sr))− Uauti (st)) +
+γ (st) (
∑
i yi (s
t)− ci (st))]
The Lagrangian can also be written in the following form:∑∞
t=1
∑
st δ
tpi (st) [
∑
i Mi (s
t−1)u (ci (st)) + (14)
+µi (st) (u (ci (st))− Uauti (st)) + γ (st) (
∑
i yi (s
t)− ci (st))]
where Mi (st) = Mi (st−1) + µi (st) with Mi (s0) = λi. In words, Mi (st) is the ini-
tial weight on agent i plus the sum of the Lagrange multipliers on her enforcement
constraints along the history st.
The first order condition with respect to ci (st) is
δtpi
(
st
)
Mi
(
st
)
u′(ci
(
st
)
)− γ (st) = 0. (15)
We also have standard first order conditions relating to the resource and enforcement
constraints, with complementarity slackness conditions. Combining the first order con-
ditions (15) for the two households for history st at time t, we have
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u′ (c1 (st))
u′ (c2 (st))
=
M2 (st)
M1 (st)
=
λ2 + µ2 (s1) + µ2 (s2) + ... + µ2 (st)
λ1 + µ1 (s1) + µ1 (s2) + ... + µ1 (st)
≡ x (st) , (16)
where x (st) can be thought of as the relative weight assigned to household 2 when
history st has occurred. Notice that, unlike in the perfect risk sharing case, where
µi (sr) = 0,∀i,∀sr, in the case of limited commitment, the relative weight x (st) will
vary over time and across states. We would like to keep x constant (as in first best),
but when an enforcement constraint binds, we cannot do that. However, intuitively we
will try to keep x (st), for all st ⊃ st−1, as close as possible to x (st−1).
The relative weight x (st), defined in (16) is used as an additional co-state variable
in order to rewrite the problem in a recursive form. This idea is due to Marcet and
Marimon (1998). To do this, suppose once again that the state of the world with respect
to income follows a Markov process, so that we may write pi (st | st−1) = pi (st | st−1).
Still, the current income state st does not tell us everything we need to know about the
past, only (st, xt−1) does, where xt−1 is the relative weight inherited from the previous
period. Denote xt the new relative weight we have to find at time t. We are looking
for policy functions for the consumption allocation and the new relative weight, with
support over the extended state space (st, xt−1), that is, we want to know ci (st, xt−1),
∀i, and xt (st, xt−1). At last, the value functions can be defined recursively as
Vi (st, xt−1) = u (ci (st, xt−1)) + δ
∑
st+1
pi (st+1 | st)Vi(st+1, xt (st, xt−1)). (17)
We may also call ci (st, xt−1) the sharing rule. Note that since policies and values depend
on xt−1, the contract is history dependent.
Numerical dynamic programming allows us to solve for the consumption allocation
and lifetime utilities, given the income processes, utility functions and discount rates
for the two households, and the initial relative weight in the social planner’s objective.
The appendix explains how in details. The next section uses the algorithm to generate
comparative static results to examine issues related to the interaction of inequality and
informal risk sharing contracts.
What are the properties of the solution? First of all, it is easy to see that, if
the discount factor δ is sufficiently large, then the perfect risk sharing solution is self-
enforcing for some x0’s (folk theorem), while if δ is sufficiently small, there does not
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exist any non-autarkic allocation that is sustainable with voluntary participation. Now,
suppose that there exists a non-autarkic solution, but the first best is not self-enforcing
for any x0.
The limited commitment solution can be fully characterized by a set of state-
dependent intervals on the relative weight of household 2, or ratio of marginal utilities,
x, that give the possible relative weights in a given income state. Note that there is
a one-to-one relationship between the relative weight and the consumption allocation,
given the income state (see (16)). These are optimal intervals, meaning that they cor-
respond to optimally chosen future promised utilities as well. Once we have found the
intervals we know everything there is to know about the solution. Denote the interval
for state s by [xs, xs].
Suppose we have inherited some xt−1 from last period, and today the income state
is s. xt is determined by the following updating rule:
xt =

xs if xt−1 > xs
xt−1 if xt−1 ∈ [xs, xs]
xs if xt−1 < xs
(18)
To see how this works, suppose that the two households are identical ex ante, u() =
log(), and their income may only take two values, yh (high) or yl (low), with yh > yl > 0.
There are four income states, hh, hl, lh, and ll, where the first argument refers to
household 1’s income, and the second to household 2’s income. Suppose that the
intervals overlap, except for states hl and lh, so xhh, xll > xlh > 1 > xhl > xhh, xll.6
Take x0 = 1, so the two agents have equal weights in the social planner’s objective.
Now, suppose that at time 1 the state is hh. In this case, x can be kept constant,
because 1 ∈ [xhh, xhh], so x1 = x0, and no transfer is made. Suppose that at time 2 the
state is lh. We cannot keep x constant any more, because household 2 is not willing
to share aggregate income equally (she would prefer to revert to autarky instead), her
enforcement constraint is binding. We set x2 = xlh > x1, agent 2 is making a transfer,
but not as large as she would in the perfect risk sharing solution. Suppose that at
6Take the numerical example from Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002), that is yl = 1 and yh = 2,
and suppose that the discount factor δ = 0.95. Then the optimal intervals are
[
xhh, xhh
]
=
[
xll, xll
]
=
[0.934, 1.070],
[
xhl, xhl
]
= [0.5, 0.961], and
[
xlh, xlh
]
= [1.041, 2], so the hl and lh intervals do not
overlap, but both overlap with the interval for the symmetric states.
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time 3 the income state is hh once again. But, unlike at time 1, now we would like to
set x3 = x2 > 1. We can do so, since we have supposed that the hh and lh intervals
overlap. Notice that we are in a symmetric state, the incomes of the two households
are equal, but household 1 is making a transfer to household 2, because of the history
dependence of the contract. In this way household 1 partly reciprocates the transfer
she got in period 2, so risk sharing with limited commitment has a quasi-credit element
(Fafchamps, 1999). Now, suppose that at time 4 the state is hl. The best we can do
is to set x4 = xhl. Now household 1 is helping out household 2, who has a bad income
realization. If at time 5 we are at a symmetric state again, agent 2 pays back some part
of the “credit” she got the previous period. The credit of period 2 is forgotten forever,
what matters is only who was constrained last, thus we may say that the economy
is displaying amnesia. Further, after a sufficient number of periods x only takes two
different values, xlh and xhl, thus the consumption allocation converges weakly to the
same distribution, independently of the initial relative Pareto weight x0.7
4 Consequences and Sources of Income Inequality
This section examines the interaction of income inequality and self-enforcing risk sharing
contracts in the context of the model presented in section 3. To do this, three types
of simulation exercises are performed. In all cases I assume that only two households
populate the village economy, and that each household’s income may take only two
values. Households are allowed to be heterogeneous in either (i) the characteristics of
their income process, (ii) some predetermined wealth, the returns of which are fixed
each period, or (iii) their risk preferences.
The first example illustrates the possible adverse consequences of inequality on the
welfare of the poor, even if per-capita income increases in the economy. The second
example looks at the effects of changes in the subsistence level on consumption smooth-
ing, and shows, for example, that as the subsistence level increases, both the mean and
7Note that, if perfect risk sharing is self-enforcing for some set of x, denote this interval [x, x], then
it does matter which x0 is chosen by the social planner. In particular, after a sufficient number of
periods, with probability 1, the ratio of marginal utilities will be one of the following, in all periods
and states: x0 if x0 ∈ [x, x], x if x0 < x, and x if x0 > x (see Kocherlakota (1996)).
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the volatility of the poor household’s consumption process decrease. The third exam-
ple is an attempt to look at the effects of informal insurance on income smoothing. In
particular, I show that (i) the availability of informal insurance may improve efficiency,
in the sense that expected income increases, (ii) lack of wealth and/or higher risk aver-
sion may prevent the poor from adopting a riskier, higher yielding technology, and (iii)
informal insurance may actually create income inequality.
All computations have been done using the software R (www.r-project.org).
4.1 Income inequality and welfare
This section examines the consequences of inequality on the welfare of the poor, given
that only the income of the rich changes. This means that we do not look at changes in
inequality in the usual sense, but rather, inequality increases together with aggregate,
and per-capita, income. This exercise is interesting because we put ourselves in a dis-
advantageous environment to find any adverse consequences for welfare. In particular,
I fix the income of the poor and give some additional income to the rich in each state
of the world. Therefore, if the poor is worse off in terms of welfare as a result, it must
somehow be due to the informal risk sharing arrangement.8
Suppose that there are two households, a poor and a rich one. Both households
have standard constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) preferences,
u(cit) =
c1−σit
1− σ ,
with identical coefficient of relative risk aversion (σ1 = σ2 ≡ σ). Both households
discount the future with discount factor δ. Note that a higher σ increases the demand
for insurance, while a higher δ helps enforcement, thus allows more risk sharing (see
Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002)).
The two households differ in their income process. The poor household receives
y = 1.5 or y = 2.5, with equal probabilities, in each period. I perform a comparative
statics exercise, changing the income process of the rich: starting from a situation close
8Note that in autarky, the welfare of the poor does not change, while in the perfect risk sharing
case, given x0, the welfare of the poor increases as the income of the rich increases (provided that with
the chosen x0, the ex-ante participation constraints are still satisfied).
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to equality, the rich getting y = 2.5 or y = 3.5, with equal probabilities as well, to
a situation where she is “a lot” richer, earning y = 14 or y = 15, still with equal
probabilities, and in each period. I take steps of 0.25, and all along I keep the riskiness
of the income process constant, in the sense that its standard deviation stays the same.9
My measure of inequality then is the ratio mean income of the rich over mean income of
the poor. Note once again that in this way, inequality increases together with per-capita
income. To specify preferences, let the discount factor δ = 0.8, and the coefficient of
relative risk aversion σ = 1.5 .
I use the algorithm outlined in the appendix to find the solution of the model given
the set of parameter values above10. The solution, that is, the constrained-efficient,
informal contract, is given by a set of state-dependent intervals that tell us what ratios
of marginal utilities are possible in each of the four states of the world. Once these
optimal intervals have been computed, I allow the economy to run for 200 periods, that
is, I generate a realization for the income state in each period, and let the contract tell
us the consumption of the households. To calculate the lifetime utility of the poor, I
take the last 100 periods.11 Finally, to compute the expected welfare of the poor, I redo
the above simulation 5000 times. Each time I take x0 = 1, that is, the social planner
would prefer an equal division of consumption and utilities in each period. The aim of
this simulation is to pin down one point on the Pareto-frontier, the point that will be
reached with probability 1 after a sufficient number of periods.
Figure 1 shows the expected lifetime utility of the poor as a function of inequality.
Note that welfare is measured on an ordinal scale here, so only the slope is informative,
the shape of the curve is not.
Figure 1 shows the main result of this subsection: it may happen that the welfare
of the poor is decreasing with increasing inequality and per-capita income, even if her
9We may also talk about the two households facing the same exogenous income process, y = 1.5 or
y = 2.5, with equal probabilities, in each period, but the rich household having some additional fixed
revenue, that varies from 1 to 12.5.
10One also needs to choose the number of gridpoints, as the continuous variable x is discretized.
Here I take a grid of 1200 intervals, considering the trade-off between precision and computation time.
11Note that 100 periods is sufficient for the economy to reach the stable distribution of consumption,
regardless of the initial relative weight, with probability very close to one. Then, it is enough to take
100 periods to calculate lifetime utility, because δ100 = 0.8100 = 2.037e−10.
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Figure 1: The welfare of the poor as a function of inequality. Welfare is expected lifetime
utility at the limited commitment solution, supposing that the economy has run for a sufficient number
of periods to reach the stationary distribution of consumption. Inequality is the ratio mean income of
the poor over mean income of the rich, and it increases together with per-capita income. The income
process of the poor is kept constant, and the standard deviation of the income process of the rich is
kept constant. The curve has been smoothed to get rid off numerical error.
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income does not change. The intuition behind this result is the following. As the
rich gets richer, her outside option becomes more attractive, thus her decision power
increases vis-a-vis that of the poor. A second point is that the rich behaves in a less
risk-averse fashion, so the insurance the poor can provide becomes less valuable for the
rich. These effects may outweigh the positive effects of higher per-capita income and
the rich being able to bear more risk, thus the poor may be worse off.
To see what is happening to the self-enforcing level of insurance, it is useful to look at
how the optimal intervals on x, the ratio of marginal utilities, change. Remember that,
to achieve perfect risk, the intervals of all four states should overlap, while in autarky,
each interval collapses to one point. Thus, roughly speaking, a wider interval means
more insurance. Figure 2 shows the (natural logarithm of the) intervals in the four
income states as a function of inequality. We see how the intervals shrink as inequality
increases, meaning that there is less and less risk sharing between the two households.
One may further examine what is behind the welfare loss of the poor in terms of her
consumption process. To do this, I compute the mean and the standard deviation of
the consumption process, to see how they change with inequality. Panel (a) of Figure 3
shows the mean, while panel (b) shows the standard deviation of the poor household’s
consumption process, both as a function of inequality. We see that what causes the
loss of welfare is higher volatility, which outweighs the positive effect of the increasing
mean. Note also that both the mean and the standard deviation converge towards their
autarkic values, 2 and 0.5, respectively.
Let us finally look at the constrained-efficient Pareto frontier for two levels of in-
equality. Figure 4 shows the Pareto frontiers for inequality = 1.5 (the rich earning
y = 2.5 or y = 3.5) and inequality = 1.625 (the rich earning y = 2.75 or y = 3.75),
together with the point on the Pareto frontier where the households end up with prob-
ability 1 after a sufficient number of periods. We see that the Pareto frontier moves
outward when the rich gets richer, so a Pareto improvement is possible. However, the
poor household’s decision power decreases so much that the point selected on the Pareto
frontier for higher inequality lies to the left of the point for lower inequality, meaning
that the poor is worse off. The reason being that she can obtain less insurance.
To summarize, in the case of risk sharing with limited commitment, the poor may
be more and more excluded from the informal insurance arrangement as the rich gets
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Figure 2: The optimal intervals of ln(x), the (natural logarithm of the) ratio of marginal
utilities, as a function of inequality. The four income states are represented by the different line-
types.
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Figure 3: The mean and standard deviation of the consumption process of the poor as
a function of inequality. The curves have been smoothed to get rid off numerical error.
richer. This loss of insurance may cause a decrease in welfare for the poor. This result
warns of the possible adverse consequence of growth in per-capita income for the welfare
of the poor, when the poor do not receive any of the additional income.
Empirical evidence on the exclusion of poor households of risk sharing networks
includes Townsend (1994), who finds that landless households are less well insured
in one of the three Indian villages in the study. Jalan and Ravallion (1999) reject
perfect risk sharing most strongly for the poorest households in their sample from rural
China, and estimate that 40% of income shocks the poor face are passed onto current
consumption (while for the richest households, only 10%). Santos and Barrett (2006)
find direct evidence that the poorest households are excluded from social networks in
Ethiopia, in particular, they do not receive transfers in case of a negative income shock.
4.2 The subsistence level and consumption smoothing
This section performs another type of comparative statics exercise. In particular, keep-
ing the income process of the two households fixed, I change the subsistence level,
25
−7.25 −7.24 −7.23 −7.22 −7.21 −7.20 −7.19 −7.18 −7.17
−5.90
−5.85
−5.80
−5.75
−5.70
−5.65
−5.60
−5.55
−5.50
Welfare of the poor
W
elf
ar
e 
of
 th
e 
ric
h
X
X
Figure 4: Pareto frontiers for two levels of inequality. The solid line is the Pareto frontier for
inequality = 1.5 (the rich earning y = 2.5 or y = 3.5), the dot-dashed line is the Pareto frontier for
inequality = 1.625 (the rich earning y = 2.75 or y = 3.75). The poor is getting y = 1.5 or y = 2.5 in
both cases. The point on the Pareto frontier where the households end up with probability 1 after a
sufficient number of periods is represented by X.
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denoted subs. In this case, the utility function can be written as
u (cit) =
(cit − subs)1−σ
1− σ . (19)
With subs > 0 preferences are characterized by decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA).
Note that the utility function (19) implies that the coefficient of relative risk aversion
is σ
(
cit
cit−subs
)
, which is decreasing in cit for subs > 0. Empirical evidence on the rele-
vance of a subsistence level, or decreasing relative risk aversion, in the case of perfect
risk sharing is provided by Ogaki and Zhang (2001).
In the case of risk sharing with limited commitment, a first, natural result is
that, when the subsistence level increases sufficiently, perfect risk sharing becomes
self-enforcing. This is because insurance becomes more valuable for both households.
The result follows from the fact that an increase in the subsistence level is equivalent
to a decrease in some fixed revenue, or wealth. Thus, with a higher subsistence con-
sumption, households behave in a more risk-averse fashion. At the limit, if in the worst
state a household’s income falls below the subsistence level, she becomes infinitely risk
averse.
To take a closer look at the effect of changes in the subsistence level on consumption
smoothing, consider two households once again, a poor and a rich one. The poor gets
y = 1.5 or y = 2.5, with equal probabilities, in each period, and the rich household
earns y = 6 or y = 10, with equal probabilities as well, in each period. The subsistence
level changes between 0 and 1.2, and I take steps of 0.05. To specify preferences, take
σ = 1.5 and δ = 0.85. Note that in this case, perfect risk sharing is self-enforcing for
subs ≥ 0.75.
Let us briefly consider welfare first. Note that preferences are changing as the
subsistence level changes, further, the welfare of both households should decrease as
subsistence consumption increases. This is what we see indeed. Figure 5 shows the ex-
pected lifetime utility of the poor (panel (a)), and the rich (panel (b)). The simulations
are conducted as in section 4.1, except that now I keep the income processes constant,
but increase subsistence consumption from 0 to 1.2.
It is more meaningful here to compare the properties of households’ consumption
processes, since incomes do not change. Figures 6 and 7 present the mean (panel (a))
and standard deviation (panel (b)) of the consumption process of the poor and the
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Figure 5: The welfare of the poor and the rich as a function of the subsistence level.
rich, respectively. We see reverse trends for the two households. Mean consumption
and variance of consumption are both decreasing for the poor, while they both increase
for the rich. The poor “buys” more insurance from the rich as she gets closer to the
subsistence level, sacrificing mean consumption. As a result, the difference in expected
consumption between the rich and the poor increases with the subsistence level.
When perfect risk sharing becomes self-enforcing, we see a kink in the line represent-
ing the standard deviation of consumption (see panel (b) of Figures 6 and 7). The poor
household is getting relatively more insurance. As the insurance technology is better
once perfect risk sharing is self-enforcing, aggregate risk can be shared efficiently, that
is, the rich, less risk-averse household may bear more of the aggregate risk.
Finally, let us look at the possible consumption values for the poor in the lim-
ited commitment solution as a function of the subsistence level (see figure 8). First,
the spread decreases as subsistence consumption increases. Second, when perfect risk
sharing becomes self-enforcing, the possible consumption values are reduced to four, the
number of income states, and there are changes in the trends. In the asymmetric states,
the trends are reversed, and consumption values in all states start getting closer to the
mean. Finally, note that even when perfect risk sharing is possible, consumption is not
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Figure 6: Mean and standard deviation of the consumption process of the poor as a
function of the subsistence level. The curve representing the mean has been smoothed to get rid
off numerical error.
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Figure 7: Mean and standard deviation of the consumption process of the rich as a
function of the subsistence level. The curve representing the mean has been smoothed to get rid
off numerical error.
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constant, only the ratio of marginal utilities. This is because only idiosyncratic risk is
insured perfectly, the households would need a third party to insure against aggregate
risk.
4.3 Consumption insurance and income smoothing
By way of a third type of examples, this section examines how (i) the possibility to
share risk, (ii) the availability of wealth that yields a fixed revenue each period, and
(iii) heterogeneous risk preferences, may influence the choice of production technology.
A production technology is described by the income process it generates. We will see
that lack of insurance, and/or lack of wealth, or higher risk aversion may lead to more
income smoothing, and thereby a loss in efficiency.
The importance of consumption smoothing possibilities in income decisions in low-
income economies has been recognized by Morduch (1994, 1995). He convincingly
argues that lack of credit and insurance not only affects the ability of households to
smooth consumption given income, but also has important consequences for production
decisions. Households have to choose safer income generating technologies in order to
avoid big income fluctuations, with which they would be unable to deal. This might
cause considerable efficiency losses. However, Morduch (1995) does not formalize these
ideas, while Morduch (1994) considers lack of consumption credit.
Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) provide some empirical evidence that people
with lack of consumption smoothing instruments have to sacrifice expected profits for
less volatile income. They look at the effect of weather variation on the mean and
variance of farm profits using data from Indian villages, and find that mean profits
decrease with weather volatility for poorer households, but not for the rich. Kurosaki
and Fafchamps (2002) find evidence that crop choices of households in Pakistan depend
on price and yield risk. Even though efficient risk sharing among households of the same
village cannot be rejected, aggregate shocks are not insured, and risk attitudes do affect
production choices.
Modeling the case where households make production decisions taking into account
that only informal insurance is available to smooth consumption, is thus an important
problem. Here I aim to have some insights concerning the issue of income smoothing,
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Figure 8: Possible consumption levels for the poor as a function of the subsistence level.
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setting up a general model, but solving only a special case.
In general, adding technology choice complicates substantially the problem at hand,
because households may switch between the technologies in any state of the world and
any time period, whether they stay in the informal risk sharing contract or revert to
autarky. In other words, the choice of production technology to be used next period
depends on the state of the world today. Below I construct two related examples, where
at the constrained-efficient solution, a household prefers to use the same technology in
all states of the world. The only switching, which is costless for simplicity, may occur
when the household leaves the risk sharing contract, and stays in autarky thereafter.
Even without solving the general model with possible switching at any time and state,
switching has to be allowed when the threatpoints are computed.
The timing is as follows. At time 0, each household chooses a technology. Note
that each technology takes one period to yield some income (one may have agricultural
production in mind, for example). At time 1, the state of the world, and incomes
are realized first, according to the technology chosen at time 0. Then each household
may decide to stay in the risk sharing arrangement, or deviate. In the first case,
each household makes a payment to the other household as specified by the contract,
consumption takes place, and finally, each household also decides which technology to
use. In case one of the households deviates, no payments are made, each household
consumes her income generated by the technology she chose one period before, and
finally, each household chooses a technology, knowing that she will be in autarky in all
future periods. At time 2 and thereafter, the same sequence of events follows as at time
1.
Let us now turn to the numerical examples. Suppose that two technologies are
available in the economy, a safer one with lower expected income, which we call the “old”
technology, and a riskier, “new” technology with higher profits in expectation. Both
technologies yield an independently and identically distributed (iid) income process,
with equal probabilities for each state. Once again, income of a household takes two
values, yl (low) or yh (high), thus there are four income states. The old technology
has the following payoffs: yl = 1.4 or yh = 2.5. The new technology yields yl = 1.2 or
yh = 2.9, in each period. Households discount the future at the rate δ = 0.95, and they
both have a utility function of the CRRA form.
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Table 1: The welfare of the poor (no wealth) in autarky
income\technology old new
low -29.765 -30.327
high -29.340 -29.676
Table 2: The welfare of the rich (some wealth) in autarky
income\technology old new
low -20.346 -20.323
high -20.204 -20.108
Now, let us look at two examples with different kind of heterogeneity among house-
holds. In example 1, the rich household has some exogenous wealth that yields a fixed
income every period, which is in addition to the stochastic income process from produc-
tion, while the poor has no wealth. In example 2, households differ in their coefficient
of relative risk aversion. I will call the less risk averse household the rich, and the more
risk averse the poor, abusing terminology.
Example 1. Suppose that both households’ coefficient of relative risk aversion σ =
1.5. The poor household has no wealth, while the rich household possesses some assets
that yield a sure revenue w = 2 each period. So the poor household’s income is y(st),
and the rich has w + y(st). The social planner’s objective is
max
{c1(st),c2(st}
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
0.95tpi (st)
(
c1(st)−0.5
−0.5 + x0
c2(st)−0.5
−0.5
)
, (20)
with pi (st) = 0.25, ∀st, subject to resource and enforceability constraints. I set x0 = 3
in the social planner’s objective (20).
With these parameter values, in autarky the poor prefers to use the old technology,
while the rich chooses the new technology. Tables 1 and 2 show the autarky values, or
lifetime utilities, discounted to time 1, that the poor and the rich get, respectively. In
these tables the higher values by row, and the resulting technology choice is marked
bold.
The values for the old technology are indeed higher for the poor household, and the
lifetime utility the new technology gives is higher for the rich, for both low and high
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Table 3: The welfare of the poor (no wealth) with informal insurance
state\technology (new,new) (old,new)
(low,low) -29.093 -29.293
(low,high) -28.840 -29.081
(high,low) -28.840 -29.126
(high,high) -28.676 -28.946
Table 4: The welfare of the rich (some wealth) with informal insurance
state\technology (new,new) (new,old)
(low,low) -20.172 -20.178
(low,high) -19.997 -20.046
(high,low) -19.997 -20.022
(high,high) -19.883 -19.938
income today. From these values the threatpoints can be computed. If a household
chose the technology optimal in autarky yesterday, just take the values from tables 1
and 2. When the household chose the other technology before, still participating in
the risk sharing arrangement, but deviates to autarky today, she consumes the income
realization from the other technology today, while tomorrow she receives the optimal
autarky values above.
Now we can look at the limited commitment solution, using these threatpoints. I
find a simple subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of this infinite game, supported by
reversion to autarky, where both households choose the new technology in all periods
and states. I compare the payoffs of a given technology choice, described by (technol-
ogy choice of the poor, technology choice of the rich) with the payoffs of a one-sided
deviation. Table 3 shows the lifetime utilities for the poor at the limited commitment
solution, in the four income states, described by (income of the poor, income of the
rich). Similarly, table 4 shows the values for the rich.
Table 3 tells us that (new,new) is preferred by the poor to (old,new). That is,
the poor chooses the new technology, given that the rich does so as well, and given
the possibility of an informal risk sharing arrangement between the two households.
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Table 5: The welfare of the poor (high risk-aversion) in autarky
income\technology old new
low -5.828 -6.608
high -5.594 -6.235
Table 6: The welfare of the rich (low risk-aversion) in autarky
income\technology old new
low -55.695 -56.145
high -55.214 -55.411
Table 4 shows that the rich would still rather use the new technology. This example
shows that (i) the availability of insurance to smooth consumption may indeed affect
the choice of production technology, and (ii) the poor household may forego higher
expected income to avoid facing more risk, because of lack of wealth coupled with
lack of insurance. Without insurance, wealth inequality causes inequality in expected
incomes, or, in other words, the availability of the new technology reenforces inequality,
since it allows the wealthy to have higher expected income from production than the
poor.
Example 2. Now, neither household has any wealth, but the poor household is more
risk averse than the rich. The poor household’s coefficient of relative risk aversion
σ1 = 2.5, while for the rich σ2 = 1.3. The social planner’s objective is
max
{c1(st),c2(st}
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
0.95tpi (st)
(
c1(st)−1.5
−1.5 + x0
c2(st)−0.3
−0.3
)
, (21)
with pi (st) = 0.25 for all st, as before, subject to resource and enforceability constraints.
I now set x0 = 0.5 in the social planner’s objective (21).
With these parameter values, in autarky both households prefer the old technology.
The autarky values for the poor household are shown in table 5, and for the rich in
table 6.
The values for the old technology are indeed higher for both households for both
low and high income. From these values we can calculate the threatpoints, similarly as
for example 1. If a household chose the old technology in the previous period, just take
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Table 7: The welfare of the poor (high risk-aversion) with informal insurance
state\technology (old,new) (new,new)
(low,low) -5.497 -5.564
(low,high) -5.339 -5.382
(high,low) -5.377 -5.382
(high,high) -5.292 -5.311
Table 8: The welfare of the rich (low risk-aversion) with informal insurance
state\technology (old,new) (old,old)
(low,low) -55.116 -55.122
(low,high) -54.540 -54.741
(high,low) -54.697 -54.741
(high,high) -54.322 -54.493
the values for the old technology from the tables. When the household chose the new
technology before, still participating in the risk sharing arrangement, but deviates to
autarky today, she gets the payoff from the new technology today, while tomorrow she
receives the old technology values above.
These threatpoints are used to find the constrained-efficient solution. Given the
constrained-efficient informal risk sharing contract, the poor household chooses the old
technology in all periods and states, while the rich produces using the new technology.
Once again, I compare the payoffs of a given technology choice, described by (technol-
ogy choice of the poor, technology choice of the rich) with the payoffs of a one-sided
deviation. Tables 7 and 8 show the lifetime utility for the poor and the rich, respec-
tively, in the four income states, described by (income of the poor, income of the rich),
allowing households to enter into an informal risk sharing arrangement.
We see that the poor would rather use the old technology given that the rich uses
the new, and that (old,new) is preferred by the rich to (old,old). This second example
shows as well that the availability of insurance to smooth consumption may indeed affect
the choice of production technology. It also demonstrates that higher risk aversion
may cause more income smoothing, thus lower expected incomes. Further, we see a
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perverse affect of informal insurance in that it actually causes inequality in expected
incomes. Notice that in autarky both households choose the same technology, and
informal insurance allows the less risk averse household to become the “rich”, that is, to
have higher expected income. In terms of welfare, however, both households are better
off if they share risk. This is trivially true, since, by definition, in the constrained-
efficient solution both households must be at least as well off as in autarky, and they
are strictly better off if some transfers occur in any state, which is the case here.
As mentioned already, the general solution of the model of risk sharing with lim-
ited commitment and technology choice is an interesting and difficult task for future
research. The difficulty comes from the fact that, in any period and any state of the
world, a household may decide to switch between the available technologies, based
on the expected lifetime utility they provide, given that the risk sharing contract
is constrained-efficient. But the constrained-efficient transfers depend also on future
technology choices. So we have to find the decision on technologies and the informal
insurance contract simultaneously.
5 Concluding remarks
Empirical evidence from low income rural communities suggests the existence of in-
formal insurance arrangements that achieve partial insurance. This paper has shown
a way to model the observed partial insurance. In particular, risk sharing contracts
were required to be self-enforcing. The numerical techniques developed to solve the
model allow one to compute the allocation in parametrized economies. In this paper I
have used these techniques to examine some issues related to income inequality. The
importance of the possible effects shown by the examples, coming from the interaction
of inequality and informal insurance contracts, is an empirical question.
However, the results warn of the possible adverse consequences of inequality on the
welfare of the poor, even if an increase in inequality only means that the rich get richer.
Further, we have seen that inequality may be reinforced without insurance, when the
wealthy choose a more profitable technology, while the poor prefer the less risky, less
efficient technology.
One direction for future theoretical work is to develop the model with more than
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one technologies. A first attempt is made in section 4.3 here. This extension would
be a very important step, since in low-income economies, production and consumption
decisions are often intertwined, because of incomplete markets. It is not optimal for
risk-averse households to maximize their expected income, when financial instruments
or insurance contracts are not available to smooth consumption inter-temporally or
across states of nature.
The framework and methods discussed in this paper may also be useful for examining
the impact of some policy intervention in future work, for example a micro-insurance
program, taking into account existing informal arrangements to share risk.
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Appendix - Computation
The aim is to solve for the decision variables, that is, consumption ci (st, xt−1), ∀i, and
the relative weight of household 2 xt (st, xt−1)12, and for the lifetime utility household
i gets from her consumption stream being in the informal risk sharing arrangement
Vi (st, xt−1), ∀i, given the state of the world today (st, xt−1).
Define a grid over the continuous variable x for each value of st. Denote X the set of
gridpoints (I define the same points for all st). Guess a solution for the value functions,
that is, guess V 0i (st, xt−1), ∀i and each gridpoint. Unfortunately, the algorithm does
not converge from any initial guess for the value functions, but the value of the perfect
risk sharing case will do.13
Now proceed to update the guess. Suppose we are at the nth iteration. Let us look
at gridpoint (s˜t, x˜t−1). Three cases have to be distinguished: (a) neither enforcement
constraint binds, (b) the enforcement constraint for household 1 binds, or (c) the en-
forcement constraint for household 2 binds (the two constraints cannot bind at the same
time, since only one of the two households has to make a transfer, and obviously the
resource constraint always binds). We first suppose that neither enforcement constraint
binds, that is, we try to keep x constant, then we see if we can do that or not.
(a) Neither enforcement constraint binds. This is the easy case, since xt (s˜t, x˜t−1) =
x˜t−1. So we only have to find c1 (s˜t, x˜t−1) and c2 (s˜t, x˜t−1), and we have two condi-
tions: u′ (c1 (s˜t, x˜t−1)) /u′ (c2 (s˜t, x˜t−1)) = xt (s˜t, x˜t−1) = x˜t−1 and the resource constraint
c1 (s˜t, x˜t−1)+ c2 (s˜t, x˜t−1) = y1 (s˜t)+y2 (s˜t) . Replacing for c2 (s˜t, x˜t−1) from the resource
constraint we have
u′ (c1 (s˜t, x˜t−1)) /u′ (y1 (s˜t) + y2 (s˜t)− c1 (s˜t, x˜t−1)) = xt (s˜t, x˜t−1) = x˜t−1.
12Here I outline the algorithm for two households. There is no difficulty in extending the algorithm
to n households theoretically. The state space has to include the vector of relative weights of length
n−1. However, in terms of computation time we face the curse of dimensionality, and the computation
time for n large, while obtaining the allocation and utilities with acceptable precision, is prohibitive.
13Characterizing the convergence properties of the algorithm is left for future research. However, we
know that the algorithm does not converge to the constrained-efficient solution from any initial guess
for the value functions. For example, if we set the initial guess equal to the autarkic values, every
iteration yields these same autarkic values. This is natural, since autarky is also a subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE).
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Supposing logarithmic utility we can easily find closed form solutions. In sum, with
u (ci) = log (ci), we have the following updated policy functions:
(s˜t, x˜t−1) = x˜t−1
c1 (s˜t, x˜t−1) =
y1 (s˜t) + y2 (s˜t)
1 + xt (s˜t, x˜t−1)
c2 (s˜t, x˜t−1) = xt (s˜t, x˜t−1)
y1 (s˜t) + y2 (s˜t)
1 + xt (s˜t, x˜t−1)
.
The next step is to check whether either of the enforcement constraints is violated.
We can do this by verifying the weak inequality
u (ci (s˜t, x˜t−1)) + δ
∑
st+1
pi (st+1 | s˜t)V n−1i (st+1, xt (s˜t, x˜t−1)) ≥ Uauti (s˜t) . (22)
Notice that we use V n−1i (). If (22) is satisfied ∀i, we set V ni (s˜t, x˜t−1) equal to the
left hand side of (22), and we are done with gridpoint (s˜t, x˜t−1). If it is violated for
household 1, we have to proceed to (b). If (22) is violated for household 2, we proceed
to (c).
(b) The enforcement constraint for household 1 binds. Now we want to find c1 (s˜t, x˜t−1),
c2 (s˜t, x˜t−1), and xt (s˜t, x˜t−1), and we have three conditions: u′ (c1 (s˜t, x˜t−1)) /u′ (c2 (s˜t, x˜t−1)) =
xt (s˜t, x˜t−1), the resource constraint c1 (s˜t, x˜t−1) + c2 (s˜t, x˜t−1) = y1 (s˜t) + y2 (s˜t), and
we know that household 1’s enforcement constraint is satisfied with equality, that is,
u (c1 (s˜t, x˜t−1)) + δ
∑
st+1
pi (st+1 | s˜t)V n−11 (st+1, xt (s˜t, x˜t−1)) = Uaut1 (s˜t). In practice,
since x is discretized, in general this equality will only be satisfied approximatively.
Let us look at the case u (ci) = log (ci) once again. Now we can write an equation
with only one unknown, xt (s˜t, x˜t−1):
log
(
y1 (s˜t) + y2 (s˜t)
1 + xt (s˜t, x˜t−1)
)
+ δ
∑
st+1
pi (st+1 | s˜t)V n−11 (st+1, xt (s˜t, x˜t−1)) = Uaut1 (s˜t) . (23)
Once again we use V n−11 (), but we evaluate it at the gridpoints (st+1, xt (s˜t, x˜t−1)), where
the economy may end up next period. Since x is discrete, one cannot use standard
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techniques to find xt (s˜t, x˜t−1). Instead, we look for xt (s˜t, x˜t−1) ∈ X such that the left
hand side of (23) is as close as possible to Uaut1 (s˜t), provided that it is weakly greater.
Once we have xt (s˜t, x˜t−1), we can easily obtain the rest of the policies. In sum, for
logarithmic utility, we have the policy updates
xt (s˜t, x˜t−1) = (the solution of (23))
c1 (s˜t, x˜t−1) =
y1 (s˜t) + y2 (s˜t)
1 + xt (s˜t, x˜t−1)
c2 (s˜t, x˜t−1) = xt (s˜t, x˜t−1)
y1 (s˜t) + y2 (s˜t)
1 + xt (s˜t, x˜t−1)
.
Finally, we can compute
V n1 (s˜t, x˜t−1) = log (c1 (s˜t, x˜t−1)) + δ
∑
st+1
pi (st+1 | s˜t)V n−11 (st+1, xt (s˜t, x˜t−1)) ,
or the left hand side of (23), and
V n2 (s˜t, x˜t−1) = log (c2 (s˜t, x˜t−1)) + δ
∑
st+1
pi (st+1 | s˜t)V n−12 (st+1, xt (s˜t, x˜t−1)) .
Notice once again that we use V n−1i () on the right hand side.
(c) The enforcement constraint for household 2 binds. We proceed symmetrically as
in (b).
Now we are done with gridpoint (s˜t, x˜t−1). We have to do the above steps at all
other gridpoints as well. Then the nth iteration is complete. We continue iterating until
the policy and value functions converge given some convergence criterion. For example
we stop iterating when
∣∣V ni (s˜t, x˜t−1)− V n−1i (s˜t, x˜t−1)∣∣ < &, ∀i, for some small &.
To obtain actual numbers for the consumption allocation and the value functions,
we have to specify the utility functions for the two households, their discount factor, the
initial relative weight in the social planner’s objective, as well as the income processes.
Using appropriate household survey data, all these can be estimated14, which allows
structural testing of the model.
14Except for the initial relative weight of household 2 in the social planner’s objective. But remember
that the distribution of the consumption allocation is independent of the initial relative weight with
probability 1, given that we are in the case of partial insurance, and the economy has been running
for a sufficient number of periods.
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